We examine networks that employ net-by reducing the transmission rate to below the min-cut of work coding and are subject to Byzantine attacks. the network, and using the redundancy to protect against We assume that an appropriate network error cor-errors. One such technique, using subspaces to code inforrecting scheme is employed that is able to correct (up mation was proposed in [3]. In this approach, the source to a certain number of) Byzantine errors. Given this sends a basis of the subspace corresponding to the messetup, we formulate the problem of locating these ma-sage. In the absence of errors, the linear operations of licious nodes that insert errors. We utilize the sub-the intermediate nodes do not alter the sent subspace, space properties of (randomized) network coding to and hence the receiver decodes the message by collectdevelop algorithms to locate the Byzantine attackers.
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ing the basis of the transmitted subspace. A malicious attacker inserts vectors that do not belong in the transmitted subspace. Therefore, if the message codebook uses
Over the past few years, network error correcting codes, subspaces that are "far enough" apart (according to an that are capable of correcting errors inserted in the net-appropriately defined distance measure), then one can work, have been developed [3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] . These correct these errors [3] . Note that in this technique, we schemes are therefore capable of delivering information do not need any knowledge of the network topology for despite the presence of Byzantine attacks in the network, the error correction mechanism. All that is needed is that as long as the number of such attacks is limited. There the intermediate nodes do not alter the transmitted subhave been codes proposed for the detection and correc-space (which can be done if they do linear operations). tion of Byzantine errors with provable rate bounds for As mentioned earlier our approach to locating advergiven error correction capabilities, along with a number of practical approaches (see for example [6] and refer-shownsthatsunde randomizedenetwork coding, the s ences therein). These network error correcting schemes . . u are designed to work without knowledge of the network spaces at the nodes of the network give information about arepnetwor the topology. Therefore, the basic premise in this paper topology.~~~~~~~~~~i s to use the structure of the erroneous subspace inserted
In this paper we ask a new question: can we use proper-by theadersaryctoreveal irmon about itslo tin ties of network error correcting codes as well as knowledge whe already ko te neorkatopology.
of the network topology to locate the nodes that insert the errors? This is motivated by recent work [4, 5] , where Other than the new problem formulation, our contriit was shown that using subspace properties of random butions in this paper are the following. For the case of the network coding, one can in many cases infer the network single adverserial node, we present simple algorithms that topology. Therefore, in this paper, we ask the question allow to identify the adversary within an uncertainty of of whether we can locate the Byzantine attackers, using at most two nodes. When there are multiple adversaries, properties of the network code, and the knowledge of the we discuss a number of algorithms, and their respective topology.
capabilities to identify adversaries. Though these are preHence, in some sense, we are here interested in the dual liminary ideas, we believe this is a promising line of reaspect of the network error correction problem: once a search Byzantine attack is detected, we would like to identify Note that for the development of the ideas in this pawhich of the network node(s) has (have) launched the at-per, we will assume that subspace network error correcttack. This would allow us to isolate the malicious attacker ing codes are used. However, the approach we will defrom the network, and thus avoid the computational com-scribe could also apply to the more traditional network plexity of correcting errors as well as prevent a possible error correction, where a coding vector is appended to escalation of the attack. each transmitted packet, and intermediate nodes perform In a network coded system, the adverserial nodes in the randomized network coding. We note that for such netnetwork disrupt the normal operation of the information work error correcting the intermediate nodes in the netflow by inserting erroneous packets into the network. This work (including the malicious ones) do not need to know can be done by inserting spurious data packets into their the position of the coding vectors within the packet, since outgoing edges. One way in which these erroneous pack-they simply need to apply the same operations to all symets can be prevented from disrupting information flow is bols in the packet. Thus corrupting a packet will corrupt the coding vector as well. We can then apply our ap-received vectors at node i up to time t (for simplicity of proach to the subspaces spanned by coding vectors. notation we omit the time index t). The paper is organized as follows. We formally state Let Hli U Hlj refer to the common span and Hli n rHi to our problem and introduce notation in Section II. We the intersection of subspaces Hi and IHj.
investigate basic subspace properties in Section III. We If v has In(v) incoming edges (parent nodes), then since examine the case of a single adversary in Section IV and we use randomized network coding, discuss how our observations extend in the case of multi-II =in(v)r1(i) ple adversaries in Section V. In Section VI, we end with a -i=1 V discussion of how we plan to extend the preliminary ideas where HW(') is the subspace v has received up to time t presented in this paper.
from the parent node i.
In the absence of any erasures or adversaries in the net-II. PROBLEM FORMULATION work each receiver R collects the exact space -Is. Assume
Consider a network represented as a directed acyclic that there is an adversary who attacks one of the nodes in graph G = (V, E). We have a source, sending information the network by combining a t-dimensional subspace HE to N receivers, and one (or more) Byzantine adversaries, with its incoming space and sending the resulting vectors located at intermediate nodes of the network. We as-to its children. In addition we will assume that t < n. sume complete knowledge of the network topology, and Then receiver R collects n < m < n + t innovative vectors consider the source and the receivers to be trustworthy that span a subspace IR. We may write (authenticated) nodes, that are guaranteed not to be ad-
versaries.
We can restrict the Byzantine attack in several ways, where '1m is an operator that acts on a space and selects depending on the edges where the attack is launched, the an m-dimensional subspace of it. The operator %Lm denumber of corrupted vectors inserted, and the vertices pends on the topology of the network and the code that (network nodes) that the adversary has access to. In this is used in the network. If nodes in the network perform paper we will distinguish between the cases where random network coding, %Lm has some random structure. We assume that the receiver is able to at least detect I. there is a single Byzantine attacker located in a ver-that a Byzantine attack is under way. Moreover, we astex of the network, and sume that the receiver is able to obtain the subspace rls II. there are multiple independent attackers, located on that the source has sent. This might be, either because different vertices, that act without coordinating with the receiver has correctly decoded the sent message, or, each other.
because after detecting the presence of an attack, has
Moreover, we will consider the cases where, an attacker requested the source subspace through a secure channel located on a single vertex inserts corrupted packets on from the source node.
(a) exactly one of the vertex outgoing edges, 
t-(m -in).
subspace Hli C EFq, if Hli(t) is the space spanned by the 1With high probability.
The above results are a direct consequence of Lemma 1
Since each receiver R knows the subspaces {Iri4) } it in [4] , and provide a lower bound for these dimensions has received from its ln(R) parents, it knows whether in the general case. Using again Lemma 1 in [4] , for what it received is corrupted or not (a subspace of Ils or two arbitrary nodes i and j, and without any further not In order to illustrate the ideas, we will first examine the edges, or in fact all the network edges, and thus we can case where the corrupted packets are inserted on a single no longer identify the attacker. The following example edge of the network, say edge eA. This corresponds to illustrates one such case.
case (a) in Section II. The extension to cases (b) and (c) 21n the following we are going to equivalently think of Fe as the is straightforward.
set of all edges that take part in these paths.
Example 2. Consider the line network shown in Fig. 2 . Suppose the attacker is node A. If the receiver R sees a corrupted packet, then using just the topology, the attacker could be any of the other nodes in the line network. This illustrates that just the topology and receiver information could lead to large ambiguity in the location itg. 2 of the attacker. D Therefore, Example 2 motivates the ideas examined in Section IV-B that obtain additional information and uti-controller. The adversary has two courses of action: it can lize the structural properties of the subspaces observed. either correctly report the subspace it received from its parent node, or lie, and claim that it received a corrupted IV-B. IDENTIFICATION USING INFORMATION FROM ALL subspace from its parent. We do not know which of the NETWORK NODES two approaches the adversary has selected. However, in We will next discuss algorithms where a central authority, both cases, we can divide the network edges into two which we will call controller, requests from all nodes in the sets, the set of edges through which is reported to flow network~~~~torpr oeadtoalifrain eae correct information, and the set of edges through which network to report some additional information, related to the subspaces they have received from their parents. is reported to flow corrupted information.
The adversary could send inaccurate information to the For example, if the adversary is node C in Fig. 2, the controller, but the other nodes report the information sets corresponding to the possible adversary actions are accurately. Our task is to design the question to the nodes depicted in Fig. 3(i) and 3 (ii) respectively. It is clear that such that we can locate the adversary, despite its possible the adversary is one of the two nodes connecting the edge msdch tion on the border of the sets, that is, in the set of vertices misdirection.
The controller may ask the nodes of the following types {C, D} for the case in Fig. 3(i) , and in the set {B, C} for of information, listed in decreasing order of complexity: the case in Fig. 3 (ii). In particular, the adversary is one of the two adjoining nodes, of the first ancestral reported Thus, a randlomly selectedl vector from llv (Information 3) allows to check whether lv C I-Is or not.
Note that we can divide the edges in these two sets
In fact, we will show in this section that for a single simply using Information 2 or 3 (these coincide for the adversary it is sufficient to use3 Information 2, and classify the edges of the network by simply testing whether edge is corrupted i the information flowing through each edge is a subspace ees coted.
of El5or no (i.e, is orruped ornot).Also note that networks where all nodes have outdegree one and arbitrary in-degree, can be treated in ex-IV-B.1. THE LINE NETWORK actly the same way as the line network. Indeed, the identification in such networks can be, without loss of generTo build the intuition behind our approach, we first ex-ality, decomposed in identification along single paths. amine the case of the line network, depicted in Fig. 2 , that corresponds to a single path connecting the source IV-B.2. GENERAL NETWORKS to the receiver. We saw in Example 2, that just topo-Consider a directed acyclic graph, and assume that we logical information was insufficient to reduce ambiguity impose a partial order on the edges of the graph, such of the attacker's location. For the line network, cases that e1 > e2 if e1 is an ancestor edge of e2 (i.e., there (a), (b), (c) in Section II coincide.
exists a path from e1 to e2). Assume now that the controller asks for Information Following a similar approach to Section IV-B-1, and 1, i.e., all nodes to report their collected subspaces to the using Information 2, we divide the edges of the network 3Using Information 2 or 3 these statements are made w.h.p, i.e., into two sets: the set of edges F0 through which are the probability goes to one as field size q -~oo. reported to flow corrupted subspaces, and the remaining edges Es through which the source information flows. in the previous section. In the presence of multiple adNote that all the outgoing edges from the source belong versaries, this may no longer be sufficient. An additional in Es, while the receiver observes at least one edge in Ec. dimension is that realistically, we may not know the exConsider case (a), where the adversary corrupts a sin-act number of adversaries present. In the following, we gle edge. Clearly, since there exists a single adversary, discuss a number of algorithms, that offer more or less EC forms a connected subgraph. Let eA be highest order identifiability guarantees. edge in this graph, i.e., eA > e for all e e Ec. Then, similarly to the case of the line network, the adversary is V-A. IDENTIFICATION USING TOPOLOGICAL one of the two nodes adjacent to this edge. We can make INFORMATION similar arguments for cases (b) and (c). This leads to the The approach in Section IV-A can be directly extended following lemma.
in the case of multiple adversaries, but again, offers no Lemma 2. Using Information 1 we can narrow the lo-identifiability guarantees.
cation of the adversary up to a set of at most two nodes. WithInfrmaton ,thesam reslt oldsw.h~.Example 3. Consider again the network in Fig. 1 knowing that the source is trustworthy, we can Proof. We know that depending on the adversaries action infer that node B is an attacker. However, any of there exists ambiguity in finding their exact location. In the nodes A, C, and D can equally probably be the fact in the worst case, the uncertainty is within a set of second attacker. All these nodes are in the shadow nodes including the adversary, its parents and its chilof node D. D dren. So if the distance between adversaries is greater than two, the "uncertainty" sets do not overlap. In this case we can easily distinguish between different adver-V-C. IDENTIFICATION USING SUBSET RELATIONSHIPS saisE saries.
For each node i e V, let P(i) = {1, ,up,} denote the set of parents of i. We are going to treat P(i) as a super node, and use the notation rlp(i) = U>p', Ilu, for the union VI. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION of the subspaces of all nodes in P(i). Also recall that FY(i) Given a network subject to Byzantine attacks, we formudenotes the subspace received by node j from node i. lated and examined the problem of locating the adverOur last algorithm checks, for every node i, whether saries. We showed that in the case of a single adversary, there exist simple algorithms that allow to identify the l C(i) L ) for node j s.t. e C F.
adversary within an uncertainty of two nodes. For the -case of multiple adversaries, we discussed algorithms and If this relationship is satisfied, we know that node i is not conditions under which we can guarantee identifiability. an adversary. If the relationship is not satisfied, that is Our future work includes investigating the best one
